The life and times of religion and human rights by Gaay Fortman, B. de & Salih, Mohamed
The Life and Times of Religion and Human Rights, in Walter E. A. van Beek et al. (eds.), Meeting Culture: Essays in Honour of Arie de Ruijter, Maastricht: Shaker, 2003, pp. 91-111 (with Mohamed Salih)


The Life and Times of Religion and Human Rights
Bas de Gaay Fortman and M.A. Mohamed Salih

"There are great cultural differences but there are also great universals."
	The Economist, January 9th 1993
Seen from a human perspective and as communal protection of human dignity, human rights are universal challenges to which all major traditions of the human family have subscribed. However, ways and means as to the realisation of this universal human ideal have been subject to controversy because of differences in the life and times in which human rights conceptions were conceived and the life and times during which they are profiled. Another issue relates to how compliance to human rights may be reinforced: by reference to the life and times during which the major religious and philosophical traditions of the human family were conceived or the life and times experienced by humans over the centuries. 

In this paper we argue that human rights and religion are mutually reinforcing insofar as human rights is related to spiritual roots and hence not conceived as “a secular religion” and provided that religion is seen within the full dynamic context of the life and times of its adherence. However, like other ethics (religious or secular) human rights ethics are about rights and wrongs, rights and duties, norms and expectations and not just instruments for compliance devout of peoples' reality. In essence we implore the contention that in the field of human rights, religion should be conceived as a mirror of the life and times during which it is practised. Concomitantly, it should be supplicated as the cultural context in which the struggle for the protection of basic human dignity has to find its spiritual roots rather than the life and times within which it became part of the human tradition.

1. The Life of Religion
One of the main questions often encountered by the student of religion and human rights is why world religions that assume a sense of universality transcending nation, state, kinship, culture and language come to pose such serious challenges to human rights’ enduring claims of counter-universality? In their face value, no world religions are devoid of a modicum of advocacy and inspiration for the respect and observance of human rights. Paradoxically, the universality of human rights and that of religion have in many a time come to a coalition course with each presenting a challenge to specific points of divergence. The points of divergence are, in our view, driven from the historical specificity of the early life and times of religion, which have changed tremendously through the centuries. The divergence as well as convergence of religion and human rights does not emanate from the general premise of the indivisibility of human rights. In retrospect, there is more in common between religion and human rights than the challenges posed by each as historical realities and encounters amongst civilizations. 

In the Judo-Christian tradition, four of the Ten Commandments instruct us that (1) you shall not murder, (2) you shall not steal, (3) do not give false testimony against your neighbor and (4) you shall not covet your fellow's possessions. A more recent re-reading of these commandments was echoed in article (4) of the Montreal Declaration on Judaism and Human Rights (April 23, 1974), which reads, 

We call on Jewish communities to preserve and sharpen the traditional sensitivity of the Jewish conscience to the plight of the downtrodden, whoever and wherever they may be. We reaffirm our faith in study, teaching and education as means to advance human rights throughout the world. More than that, we pledge to be advocates and activists for human rights. 

The life and times of Moses and the Ten Commandments and the practices of a reconstituted Jewish State are a world apart, but the essence of the message now and then is the same: “Human rights are an integral part of the faith and tradition of Judaism. The beliefs that man was created in the divine image, that the human family is one, and that every person is obliged to deal justly with every other person are basic sources of the Jewish commitment to human rights (Article I of the Montreal Declaration). ​[1]​

In Christianity, the message is not different. In the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5:43-48), Christians were told to defy the truism, “Love your friend, and hate your enemy". Instead it is pronounced in the Sermon on the Mount that, 

But what I tell you is this: Love your enemies and pray for your persecutors; only so can you be children of your heavenly Father, who makes his sun shine on good and bad alike, and sends the rain on the honest and the dishonest. If you love only those who love you, what reward can you expect? Surely the tax-gatherers do as much as that. And if you greet only your brothers, what is there extraordinary about that? Even the heathen do as much. There must be no limit to your goodness, as your heavenly Father’s goodness knows no bounds. 

Human rights is portrayed as a call for respecting the dignity even of those who intend to humiliate you ushering in compassion as the essence of tolerance and accommodating the views of others even when these views are confrontational. 

True Islam also advocates human rights. The conception of human rights in Islam is outlined by Allamah Abu a-Ala Mawdudi as follows: Every human being has (1) the right to life, (2) the right to the safety of life, (3) respect for the chastity of women, (4) the right to a basic standard of life, (5) individual's right to freedom, (6) the right to justice, (7) equality of human beings and (8) the right to co-operate and not to co-operate with rules.​[2]​ It is doubtful whether non-Muslims or secularists would disagree with such a notion of human rights. However, since the democratic credentials of the rulers of the states that proclaimed themselves Islamic are questionable, it is obvious that they abuse human rights under the name of Islam. The reality is even worse with militant Muslims, despite the militants’ insistence on the divinity of some historical cultural practices vis-à-vis controversial sharia issues such as women individual freedoms and position in Islamic public law (inheritance, stoning to death for adultery), flogging and amputation of limps for theft. Mawdudi hastens to lament that: 

Thus all those temporal authorities who claim to be Muslims and yet violate the rights sanctioned by God belong to one of these two categories, either they are the disbelievers or are the wrongdoers and mischief-makers. The rights which have been sanctioned by God are permanent, perpetual and eternal. They are not subject to any alterations or modifications, and there is no scope for any change or abrogation".

At a larger synthesis: Who are those Muslim, Christian and Jewish leaders who abuse human rights and still claim to be doing that in order to protect or comply with the teachings of their faith? Is the discrepancy between believe and practice a religious necessity or part of political expediency or both? This question was addressed in terms of dichotomies. Kelsay and Twiss (1994: 72-73) put it in terms of significant distinctions in the relation between religion and advocacy for human rights.​[3]​ The distinctions are premised in respect to: 1) appearance versus reality, 2) duties versus rights, 3) theory and practice 4) law versus morality and 5) whole versus part. 

At a crude level of generalization, it is obvious that the life of religion is changing with its times, and so is the socio-economic and political context within which the religious meaning and message are perceived and acted upon. A glimpse at the life of religion would instruct us that all world religions had emerged to redress one form or another of human right crisis. 

Above all matters of belief, Christianity as a world religion evolved as a reaction to the disintegration of the Roma Empire and the declining morality of its city states which ushered in an age of tyranny in which civilization became synonymous with the brutality of rulers and the arrogance of aristocracy. The situation was not different for Islam, which emerged in Mecca, a society described as one immersed in vices and oppression. It was a polytheist society that turned its back to Christianity and Judaism and worshipped idols and man-made Gods. The aristocracy of Mecca accumulated large amounts of wealth through extortion, exploitation and oppression. In what was known as Jahiliya (the age of ignorance, an equivalent to “the dark ages”) in which infanticide (or the killing and burial of girls) was commonplace and sanctioned by tradition. ​[4]​

World religions therefore came about as alternative civilization missions to civilizations in crisis. Historically, civilization crises were known for their disrespect for human dignity, which the world religions strived to restore. As sources of alternative value systems and a response to lives filled with darkness, world religions have since maintained a confrontation posture to injustice and abuse of human rights so much so that some these religions, particularly their militant versions, considered all that is not divine as a challenge to their authority, even when ideas such as the modern conceptions of human rights contrive to espouse a universal notion of human dignity.

However, let us not lose sight of the fact that Christianity, Judaism and Islam are a world apart in their conception of what really constitutes what is behind the facade of anonymity over the respect of human dignity. More precisely, the difference is on whether religious and cultural differences impact on the quality of human relations and the relativity of dignity, even the receptivity of culture for that matter. The conflict between worldly politics and heavenly claims are not new in Jewish, Christian and Islamic thought.​[5]​ However, unlike Judaism and Islam, the Christian world has adopted Roman rather than divine law. In a recent study (Kraynak 2000) argues that, “Christian divine law cannot be codified directly into civil law or translated into a specific political order.”​[6]​ In Jesus’ words, it implies a distinction between duties to God and duties to the ruler (Caesar), requiring some detachment from government or an apparent intimacy between church and government. The fear here is that a church close to government might fail its responsibility to protecting the rights of those aggrieved by government action.

To be sure, the contention between religion and the modern conception of human rights, (despite their claim of universality), constitute a domain of competing and at times contrasting views vis-à-vis the debate on universality versus relativism. In other words, relativism invokes either bygone historical realities or realities reminiscent of the early life of religion, but projected by some religious establishments as at odds with the times of human rights. Due to their historical depth, which goes back to millennia, the times of all religions are unambiguous about the absence, even the abuse of human rights in the stark socio-economic and political realities that contributed to their emergence. 

Orentlicher summarizes the relativists’ position as follows: “Moral claims derive their meaning and legitimacy from the (particular) cultural tradition in which they are embedded”.​[7]​ In the relativists' view, argues Orentlicher, “What we call universal human rights are, in fact, an expression above all of Western values derived from the Enlightenment.” Understood in this light, the human rights idea is at best misguided in its core claim that it embodies universal values - and at worst a blend of moral hubris and cultural imperialism". In our view, the counter critique of relativism centers on two points: 1) Cultural and religious relativists deny the relativism and this is more so in the case of religion. In other words, with all their claims of universality, religions have constantly adapted the messages of their times and life either to the changing global reality or to the realities of the societies and new-geographical areas to which they have expanded. 

In a sense the debate, turf conflicts and competing claims within religion are as diverse and complex as their claims with other religions and secularists. While the message and meaning of the religious verse (as we have seen earlier), constitute an embodiment of human dignity, dignity as described by Ingatieff as agency “expresses itself in political and civil freedom, in the exercise of human choice and collective deliberation”. Ignatieff continued, 

In effect, international human rights covenants and declarations seek to re-create for the international society of states the norms that govern the relation between citizen and state in a democratic polity, to make all human beings citizens rather than subjects of the states they give obedience to. ​[8]​

Religion and the problem of cultural receptivity An allied conception of the debate on Universalism versus Cultural Relativism is the problem of socio-cultural receptivity and the extent to which “difference” should be allowed to stifle the implementation of the human right in question in respect of distinct cultural values. Or, to frame the question more positively, to what extent should we allow negative values and traditions to frame the debate over more enduring global ethics and norms that secure dignity as agency and agency as freedom. Assuming that cultural and value specificity is always a hindrance to human rights is not in par with the reality that some positive and human rights' enriching values can be an aid rather than an obstacle to human rights.  

In essence, then, religion is the powerhouse of cultural relativism. Evidently, its impact on socio-cultural receptivity is both enduring and absorbing. Because culture is concerned with the particular and context bound norms, ethics and morality, is apparears to be difficult for some religious elements to cope with the legally undisputed universality times of human rights, as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as various covenants, protocols and conventions of the United Nations. 

Notably, that universality does not at all guarantee universal implementation. While from a legal perspective states, regardless of their religious claims, are under a general obligation to respect and promote human rights - particularly in regard to certain core rights whose implementation is regarded as obligationes erga omnes​[9]​ -, procedures to enforce their realization by unwilling governments are of a political rather than judicial nature. “Composed of Member States, the Commission on Human Rights has become a House of Impunity”, Zoller concludes his review of the UN Commission’s session in 2002.​[10]​ 

Paradoxically, however, religion may not find comfort in probing that even the adoption of the required resolutions -censuring the governments responsible for serious human rights violations- is not possible, let alone bridging the gap between words and deeds. For it is for obvious reasons that world religions remain divided within and without. Conversely, human rights as a “secular religion” faces a spiritual crisis since the realization of the values behind its norms needs continuous spiritual nurturing. Indeed, in responding to political opportunism, the rhetorical strength of the human rights discourse in itself does not suffice. Human rights implementation will also depend on the moral strength of the human rights idea within a particular society and the capacity of that society to see universality as source of enrichment rather than a conscious conspiracy to thwart its message. Thus, the question of receptivity to human rights confronts us with the moral foundations of the human rights idea in regard to political and cultural differences. This is a rather complicated matter in which we shall delve a little deeper later on. 

Naturally, problems of cultural receptivity and human rights are not confined to non-Western peoples. Apart from implementation in Western societies themselves -which is not unproblematic, take for example the resistance against economic, social and cultural rights in the USA- the very idea of universality signifies also Western responsibility for the realization of human rights for people in other parts of the world. Rapidly increasing global inequality illustrates, however, the lack of global mechanisms to correct injustices. The phrase “everywhere in the world” as used by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his Four Freedoms Address and subsequently endorsed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights now requires primarily implementation rather than standard-setting. Whatever view one takes on the question of universality of human rights norms, there definitely is a universal problem of receptivity.

It should also be realized that cultural receptivity is not a one-way process from existing and unchanging human rights norms to certain specific cultures. Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights there has been a growing influence from non-Western cultures on formulations in new charters and covenants. This has meant a shift in emphasis towards duties, also in regard to communities, positive freedom rights (economic, social and cultural rights) and collective rights. In further attempts to objectivize human rights non-Western views on justice may play an increasing role. Indeed, although an individual-centered and rights-oriented view lies at the roots of the historical process of formulating international human rights standards, a growing moral universality will require receptivity to alternative approaches to justice. In regard to economic and social rights a predominance of non-Western (communitarian) thinking is already noticeable. As Virginia Leary has concluded:

Despite its contemporary Western origin dating to post Second World War, the antecedence informed by the earlier life of World religions and moral philosophies, the concept of human rights must now be recognized as a universal term accepted through the world. But the concept is a dynamic and evolutionary one that has recently been extended to cover many aspects of human dignity not contemplated under the traditional Western rubric of human rights. Western influence, dominant in the origin of the development of international human rights norms, is now only one of a number of cultural influences on the development of international human rights standards. Its contribution to the development of human rights has been great, but it has not been unique, and other cultures have made and are making significant contributions to our collective conception of human dignity​[11]​.  

Not surprisingly, then, cultural justifications for continuing violations of human rights in the name of religion become untenable because they tend to come from politicians rather than the moderate religious establishment – be it Judo-Christian or Muslim. Religion, we note, is subject to rather strong political manipulation.

It is noteworthy that while in their Western historical context human rights developed as a protective concept - to defend the autonomy of individual citizens against threats coming particularly from sovereigns (states) that would try to extend their power into the citizens own realm - in the cultural context of Africa, Asia and South- and Central America the human rights idea is of a much more emancipatory character: a struggle for rights of the have-nots. While our analysis revealed already that human rights are highly action-oriented, this applies particularly to the situation in developing countries. “Human rights”, Surendra has noted from an unmentioned observer, “have often been functioning as the rights of the privileged both at the world level and also in national and local societies. But the dispossessed, the underprivileged, and that is the majority of the world, they regard human rights as instruments of liberation and emancipation”​[12]​. In such a context human rights are used as a legal resource for social change while playing their part particularly in the struggles of social movements.

Essential in such struggles for social change is the conscientization  of those who have to fight for their own rights so that apathy and resignation to the status quo may be overcome. Hence the challenge of cultural receptivity is to get the human rights idea integrated into their hearts. 

The real question, in other words, is not the universality of the human rights idea itself but a  universal reception of that idea. No single culture in the sense of a way of life transferred from one generation to the next is fully receptive to the notion of universal human dignity and equality. It is an illusion to think that this idea might be simply disseminated by means of readable material. Indeed, the hu​man rights project cannot escape confronting deeper questions such as “Who is the human being?” and “What is freedom?”​[13]​ 

Clearly, then, the acceptance of responsibility for the protection of other people’s dignity requires more than just a legal basis, no mat​ter how universal that foundation may be. Indeed, the ratifica​tion of treat​ies, the establishment of courts of human rights and the development of hu​man rights jurisprudence is not enough. The moral grounds for a conviction up​on which responsible behavior rests have to be constantly nurtured on the basis of a worldview. Insofar as the notion of human rights finds its origin in indi​vidu​alism, it is responsible individualism that obtains. This is evidently not the same as possessive individualism.​[14]​ Yet the former may easily degen​er​ate into the latter.

It is exactly those cultures in which possessive individualism has strong roots -and that includes the globe as such- that experience great difficulty with economic and social rights, already at the stage of standard‑setting. While individualism may offer a sufficient moral foundation for respecting everyone's fundamental freedoms, it is inadequate as a basis for accepting other people's needs as grounds for justified claims. Economic, social and cultural rights pre​suppose not just free individuals but a community that accepts responsibility for the fulfillment of everybody's basic needs. This, then, points once again to a crucial role of religion in efforts to overcome constraints in cultural receptivity. But before going a little more deeply into this matter, we shall now turn to the times of human rights.

2. The times of human rights
The life of religion must have taught us that the times of human rights do not just date back to the founding of the United Nations in 1945. In fact, the drive to protect human dignity against abuse of power is as old as human history. A classic example of the supremacy of human dignity is the appeal to the higher laws of heaven by Sophocles’ Antigone, when she defies King Creon’s laws by burying her brother Polynices within the walls of the city. This element of resistance in human rights is also expressed in the Dutch national anthem, in which William of Orange, in his struggle to overcome tyranny, refers to justice as a primary duty towards God, transcending any duty towards an earthly sovereign. In all sorts of cultural and religious settings such instances of dignity transcending mere power may be found.

With regard to its times, then, there are two dimensions of human rights: the human rights idea through the ages; and the post World War II period of protection of human dignity by international law. That the human dignity of every human being ought to be respected and protected may be seen as part of the spiritual heritage of humankind. The relevant adjective is, indeed, spiritual, rather than cultural. Culture, as Arie de Ruijter has taught us, is a continuous process of construing, upholding and challenging differences among people, of inclusion and exclusion, of drawing lines between “us” and “them”.​[15]​ Human rights, conversely, is a moral universal based on a belief in the inherent dignity of the human being, a simple consequence of being born in this world, a reference just to each and all. 

Naturally, the contrast here is a little constructed. Moral views, convictions and commitments are always imbedded in cultural settings; hence, by postulating human rights above culture the debate between universalism and cultural relativism cannot be simply determined. Indeed, neither legal universalism nor cultural relativism settles the issue once and for all. Rather than either supra cultural or sub-cultural, the point is inter-cultural: through ages of globalization a global spirituality has emerged too, and part of that is a global ethos sustaining the human rights idea. In addition to the evidence already cited above, attention may be drawn to the “Declaration towards a Global Ethic” prepared by Hans Küng and adopted by a Jewish-Christian-Muslim “Parliament of the World’s Religions” in Chicago in 1993.​[16]​ Checking this worldview with more than five hundred students at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, coming from all different angles of our world, we found, indeed, a 100% confirmation of the human rights idea. Notably, that idea is not confined to the belief in inherent dignity; it also stipulates a communal responsibility for its protection. 

The belief that basic human dignity ought to be protected follows, as was already noted, from a long history of abuse of power. Remarkably, power, as humankind has come to realize, will not automatically be exercised in accordance with values and norms tuned to respect for the dignity of those affected by its use. History has taught us that perceived self- or group-interest is a driving force of formidable dimensions, which is not necessarily in line with public justice. However, while protection is evidently necessary, opinions may still differ on how to organize that. One way would be to delegate that responsibility to the Sovereign; another way would be to see the protection of people’s dignity against abuse of power as a responsibility of the entire community as such.

The snag with traditional arrangements for the protection of human dignity has been well summarized in Seneca’s plaintive question “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” (Who guards the guardians?).​[17]​ Notably, this applies to modern ways of rights-based protection, too. Thus, in the international venture for human rights that started with the founding of the United Nations in 1945, states play a dual role: that of protectors as well as violators of basic human dignity. To understand this paradox let us take a closer look at what may be called “the human rights deficit”.

Notably, the new global endeavor for the realization of human rights suffers from a huge deficit that is all too often submerged in the general euphoria of human rights declarations, conferences, committee meetings and workshops. It manifests itself in four domains: impunity of state-related perpetrators of violations of civil and political rights; the apparent lack of protection offered to minorities; the continued barrier of the public-private divide and its paralyzing effects on the struggle against domestic violence; and the violation of economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) in a world in which so many people’s basic needs remain denied. That fundamental weakness in human rights concerns their relation to social reality: declared rights, all too often, at the beginning of what are bound to be long and enduring struggles for implementation rather than acquired rights in the sense of formal legal protection of freedoms and titles that had already acquired societal recognition as sources of entitlements. 

The purpose of rights, as interests protected by law, is to put conflicts of interests in a normative setting and thus to prevent their manifestation as pure power struggles. Society is expected to function in such a way that rights are respected, while claims based on entitlements connected to those rights get honored. Dispute settlement should be confined to cases in which there are conflicting claims protected by different rights (between landlord and tenant, for example). But although rights are abstract acknowledgements of claims in the sense of a public-political commitment to offer legal protection for their realization, the world is full of denials of claims founded upon people’s fundamental freedoms and basic entitlements. Actually, while the whole idea of rights is based upon the expectation that evident violations would lead to contentious action resulting in redress, human rights often remain without effective remedies. Adequate embodiment in positive law is all too often lacking, while these rights get violated in and from centers of power, too. This is due to two crucial deficiencies: firstly, the often prevailing inadequacy of law as a check on power, and secondly, the lack of reception of these rights in many cultural and politico-economic contexts. An additional snag lies in the limits of human rights as a modern justice discourse. It is in addressing these three predicaments that religion may have a crucial part to play. The problem of cultural receptivity was already discussed above. Hence, let us now look at the times of human rights in respect of these two other contemporary snags a little more closely: the role and rule of law and the limits of human rights as a modern justice discourse.

The role and rule of law. Law implies order in the public-political community, and hence protection of people (personal security), their property (stability of possessions) and their deals (pacta sunt servanda). Its essence is that it binds power to certain norms, implying at the least normative processes of settling disputes. Generally, however, law is expected to attain more than just order. A deeper layer of normativity lies in the concept of public justice, stipulating what is generally considered to be right from the perspective of the community as a whole and hence ought to be enforced. This goes beyond mere formal equality –equal treatment of equal cases- while implying the recognition of fundamental freedoms and basic needs (social justice), too. The notion of order, in other words, has to be supplemented with justice: the Rule of Law. 

Thus, legal norms are meant not only to regulate in the sense of securing order but also to reflect what is generally seen as right and hence ought to be enforced. Consequently, law implies a mission of a high noble character as exemplified in the inscription shown in the reading room of the Harvard Law School’s library: Of Law no lesse can be acknowledged than that her seat is the bosom of God.​[18]​ The reference to the Upright One implies a fundamental allegiance of religion to justice. Law, in other words, is to bind power to a morality that is seen as essential to the integrity of the community as such.​[19]​

However, while law is meant to ensure an orderly protection of interests and an orderly settlement of disputes arising out of conflicting interests by regulating and delimiting power, it naturally reflects existing power relations at the same time. Consequently, every community and society manifests an inescapable dialectic of law and power.​[20]​ The position of a certain country on a hypothetical scale from 100% power and 0% law, to its opposite of 100% law with 0% power, depends on factors such as the democratic character of its institutions and historically grown cultures of personal leadership​[21]​. Thus, there are countries in which implementation of human rights still primarily requires a struggle for law and access to justice. Notably, when it comes to implementation of the rights of the poor, the legal system as such appears to be a major constraint. One thing the World Bank’s Voices of the Poor studies​[22]​ have made abundantly clear is that poor people live in adverse environments in which neither the economy nor state and law function in any way conducive to the realization of human rights. In such a context the structural struggle is for the role and rule of law as such, and for access to justice as a first implication of a human rights based approach to poverty and underdevelopment.​[23]​  Particularly problematic in this connection is the lack of enforcement potential at the global level. Indeed, contemporary international human rights law excels in standard setting, while being mediocre in monitoring of observance, and manifestly weak in enforcement and implementation.​[24]​

It should be noted here that law is not to be identified with a set of rules.​[25]​ Law is a continuous process of finding and deciding in an orderly manner on what is right. The institutions upon which it is based consist, indeed, of substantive and procedural rules, but also of a personnel organization and resources to meet the demands upon it. In this respect, the newly established International Criminal Court (ICC) may be seen as a big step forward in the fight against impunity.  

However, even in a well functioning legal order rights will not automatically be realized. The primary responsibility for implementation of subjective rights rests with the legal subjects. Indeed, it is these rights-holders who would first have to come into action themselves. This applies to human rights too, including the rights to decent livelihoods. Thus, a self-confident and assertive attitude is an evident component of a rights approach to injustice. Here lies an obvious connection with culture and religion as possible constraints as well as potential sources of motivation and inspiration.

The liberal‑democratic idea—according to Fukuyama, the end of the history of ideas​[26]​—fails here. “The strong”, as the Greek historian Thu​cydides has put it in his account of the Peloponnesian war, “do what is in their power and the weak accept their fate.” In a free market economy the weak find no structural protection against un​employment, disease, disabil​ity, and old age. Dependence on the charity of the strong did not work and was considered unsatisfactory, too. In many industrialized countries measures such as workers' protection, compulsory education, profes​sional training, and health protection constituted a structural attempt towards the realization of economic and social rights. The social struggle that led to such achievements was nurtured by religion in the sense of a set of ideas trans​cending individual existence. (In this sense socialism, too, may be re​garded as a religion.)

Friedrich Hayek, the godfather of neo‑liberalism, once wrote a book under the title The Mirage of Social Justice. It is only a negative notion of freedom, he feels (keep your hands off other people's property, allow everyone her liberty) that can be more than a mirage. Hence, for a vision of social justice we have to look elsewhere. One academic attempt lies in “non-ideal” philosophy. 

The philosopher John Rawls has attempted to construct pol​itical principles of justice applicable to any society that tackles the problem of inequalities among people as well.​[27]​ His theory is based on a hypothetical social contract between citizens who, behind a “veil of ignorance” regarding their relative success or failure in acquiring entitle​ment positions, decide what is socially “fair.” This is not the place to review that theory critically, but what is noteworthy is that Rawls's rational-liberal theory of justice failed him when he tried to construct a political ‘law of peo​ples' that would legitimate human rights on the basis of reason only.​[28]​ For one thing, he feels compelled to abandon the three egalitar​ian fea​tures of his theory of justice: the fair value of political liberties, fair equality of opportun​ity and the difference principle.​[29]​ Thus, his human rights concept deals only with civil rights and excludes political and socio-economic rights. His argument then implies that even representatives of hierarchical soci​eties, committed in a rather absolute sense to certain ideologies and religions, placed behind a veil of ignorance (the basic assumption in hypothetical contract theory) would accept the same “law of peoples,” including basic civil rights, as democratic societies. But why would they? As Stanley Hoffmann has put it:
			Are societies whose governments are dogmatically committed to ideology or religion likely to respect basic human rights at all? Since there are no free elections, how would we know that their “system of law” meets “the essentials of legitimacy in the eyes of [their] own people”? Whatever the answer, what is clear is that Rawls's law of peoples has been shaped so as to appeal to a purely hypothetical group of peoples.
			The fallacy here is in the parallel Rawls seems to draw between an “overlapping consensus” of comprehensive doctrines that endorse a single conception of justice within a democratic political culture ..., and an “overlapping consensus” of societies based on very different political conceptions of justice. Such different societies could only endorse a very weak “law of peoples.”​[30]​
Hence, for a stronger “law of peoples” we have to look beyond “non-ideal theory” (Rawls). Indeed, we cannot escape the search for the conceptual roots of human rights within the various religions them​selves. Research points to a preliminary conclusion that the idea of one person's responsibility for satisfaction of another person's needs is common to all world religions.​[31]​ One example is the Old Testament term Tsedâqâh, which implies the acknowledgement of the claims of the poor, purely on basis of their need. Thus, the connection with religion may provide a highly necessary cultural basis for the human rights struggle. Apart from all sorts of political and economic constraints to the implementation of human rights, there also ex​ists a major obstacle in the cultural resistance to norms and values im​plying that people are responsible for the well‑being of their fellow human be​ings. Indeed, a culture of contentment predominates in the post‑Cold War era, paralyzing the global ‘haves'. Christopher Lasch spoke of a rebellion of the elites and the betrayal of democracy.​[32]​ With so many people ex​cluded from a de​cent existence, the human rights project suffers from structural day-to-day violation.

Apparently, to find its roots in the hearts of people the human rights idea primarily requires support rather than obstruction by existing cultural identities. Here again we touch upon the role of religion. One relevant factor is, for example, the way people look at the course of events, as "the Will of God" or as the result of human action. Another aspect concerns people's approach to power, in full submission or critically demanding accountability. One might also mention attitudes towards plurality, religious zeal based on fundamentalism - compelle intrare - as against tolerance and acceptance of other people's fundamental freedoms. These are just some of the elements to be taken up in our concluding observations.

The limits of human rights Actually, human rights have assumed the role of the modern global justice discourse. Justice, as was stressed already, is the set of values and norms generally considered to be essential from the perspective of the community as a whole and whose enforcement, therefore, must be seen as a communal responsibility. Now the point is that the international assumption of a global universal responsibility for justice that was embarked upon after World War II, took its starting point in individual subjective rights. To understand the implications, let us take a closer look at the human rights approach to poverty and development as propagated by international agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as a follow-up of Kofi Annan’s appeal for “a mainstreaming of human rights”. The new “approach” –“conviction” or “commitment” seem to be more appropriate terms- got a real impetus with the Human Development Report 2000 that was specifically devoted to human rights and development.  

The core of UNDP’s Human Development Report 2000 is chapter 4: Rights empowering people in the fight against poverty. Here the whole “approach” has to be made concrete. Not surprisingly, this appears to be far from easy. Basic economic rights such as the right to a decent standard of living (article 25, Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], already quoted above) “are not just development goals”.​[33]​ Yet, such “rights do not mean an entitlement to a handout”.​[34]​ Thus, a person without work cannot simply go to court and claim employment. The problem lies in the meaning and implications of human rights as “real” rights in the sense of rights with effective remedies. In his earlier publication on Human Rights and Economic Achievement Amartya Sen, the auctor intellectualis of the HDR, had already referred to Jeremy Bentham’s disqualification of “natural and imprescriptible rights” as “nonsense on stilts”.​[35]​ In other words, is it really possible to protect general interests of human beings by law, or, in another terminology, to abstractly acknowledge claims based on certain essential human interests? The report evidently wrestles with this problematic. Recourse is sought in Dworkin’s distinction between “abstract rights” and “concrete rights”.​[36]​  “In this conception a person has concrete rights to the appropriate policies –not to food, housing and the like, which are abstract rights”.​[37]​ The point is, however, that rights are abstract while claims are concrete. To have a right does not automatically imply that all claims based on titles protected by it, get honored. This depends not only on the strength of the right in question as reflected in the values behind it and the kind of protection it offers but also on the fulfillment of possible conditions that would have to be obtained in order to activate the right in question as well as on competing claims by others and the relative strength of the rights held by them. This is a matter of the actual availability of the freedoms and entitlements the rights in question intend to cover. The right to health, by way of example, remains rather dormant in a juridical sense as long as the rights-holders lack daily access to clean water and sanitary provisions.

With regard to economic, social and cultural rights the strong language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was specified and at the same time weakened in subsequent covenants. This manifests itself particularly in the notion of progressive realization, a terminology also adopted in the Human Development Report 2000.​[38]​ The background to that clause is that non-implementation may be rooted in lack of available resources. Yet, the realization of economic, social and cultural rights is also a highly confrontational matter, since efforts towards their implementation challenge existing power structures. While the Report follows earlier UNDP language as to the need for promoting “a rights-enabling economic environment”,​[39]​ in reality many people live in adverse or disabling conditions when it comes to implementation of their basic human rights. The entitlement failure that lies at the roots of denial of their basic needs is the consequence of gross injustices following from the distribution and use of economic and political power. Hence, rather than a mere moral discourse, human rights is a field of struggle. Addressing the injustices behind entitlement failure is confrontational and dangerous. Witness, for example, the frightful repercussions Dalits in India are faced with when, invoking their right to food, land and a decent life, they stop performing humiliating services to the upper-castes. 

The chapter on poverty of the HDR 2000 reveals an evident deficit in current instruments to realize the rights of the poor. Not surprisingly, it is followed by a full chapter on indicators. It is noted here that “indicators are needed that can create a culture of accountability”.​[40]​ Such indicators should show the impact that a specified actor has on the (non)-implementation of a certain right. With due acknowledgement of all that is proposed here for further elaboration, we miss a focus on the link between indicators, instruments and action. The issue is that indicators remain rather meaningless if not connected to instruments that may be employed for concrete action in the implementation of rights. 

Coming back now to the reality of adverse environments in which poor people tend to live, human rights appear to be not entirely meaningless. While in such contexts judicial action is not likely to have much effect, collective action may still be based upon human rights as a forceful moral rhetoric. The point is that behind these rights are principles of justice and hence, while stating the fundamental freedoms and basic entitlements of everyone, they may also be seen as statements of what is right, or standards of legitimacy. In this connection, universality means that there is no legitimate use of power unless in conformity with human rights standards. In this respect human rights serve as political instruments.​[41]​ This affects not just the power of the state but also that of all actors, including corporations, as the UNDP Report duly notes. Actors become duty-bearers: there lies the crux of human rights based approaches. 

So far we discussed the limits of human rights as a vehicle of justice. Another constraint concerns its content. Behind the various rights as formulated in declarations of the UN’s General Assembly and in the various covenants and conventions are fundamental values that constitute the core of our civilization. Indeed, concretely formulated human rights norms embody principles of justice such as life as a value per se, liberty, equality, due process, decency (honeste vivere), stability of possessions, and the quality of life.

A particularly problematic principle in this summary is equality. It is striking to note that in the fifty-five years since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) income inequality, for one thing, has increased tremendously. Thus, while in 1960 the ratio between the upper and lower quintiles in global income distribution was 30:1, in 1990 it had doubled to 60:1, and in 2000 to 72:1. Global justice requires a primary investigation of the global structures resulting in such evident socio-economic inequality.​[42]​ 

One reason why apparently human rights have not served as an egalitarian discourse might well be that they have been defined in a rather absolute manner: nobody can be tortured; everyone has the right to education, etcetera. Equality, however, has to do with the relations among people. Insofar as there exists a qualification of the rights in question what we find is the adjective “adequate”: e.g. a standard of living adequate to the health of everyone. While the term "adequate" could also be interpreted in a relative sense, among jurists the tendency has been to work on absolute standards, elaborated into specifications of what precise entitlements might be derived from the “core” of the right in question. There exists, however, one obvious reference to substantial equality: article 1 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” However, this clause could well be seen as a specimen of ius divinum in the newly emerged secular religion of human rights, a confession rather than a concrete way of protecting people by law. This interpretation gains force by looking at what follows in 1 (2): “They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” If only that came true. 

It is generally accepted, however, that the first part of article 1 UDHR implies formal equality or, in legal terms, equal treatment of equal cases. Not without reason it is followed by article 2 that stipulates the non-discrimination principle. Article 7 explicitly states that “All are equal  before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.” In article 10 we find the term “full equality” linked to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. 

Hence, the question remains whether article 1 has a substantial significance that would entail a lever on unequal outcomes. As equality here relates to human dignity, we argue that it does. No human being may be regarded as being of less or more value than any other creature. This ought to be reflected in not merely institutions and their accessibility to each and everyone, nor just in principles of due process but also in outcomes. Indeed, there are situations in life that manifest such degrees of substantial inequality that these can be seen as an evident violation of article 1. First and foremost among these is global socio-economic inequality.

Now it could obviously be argued that this falls beyond the scope of any reasonable system of positive law. Wouldn't it be unthinkable that an individual or group went to court and claimed substantial equality? In response we should first like to note that substantial equality does not entirely fall outside the realm of private law. Notions like undue influence, abuse of law and unjust enrichment, for example, address the relations among people in processes of acquirement. In public administrative law we find principles such as putting the heaviest burdens on those with the strongest shoulders to carry it. Hence substantial equality as a reflection of equal birth does appear to have an impact in “the law of civilized nations”.

Consequently, then, we would have to see the poor as primary actors in processes towards more substantial equality. While allocating a primary responsibility for implementation to the rights-holders themselves is naturally in line with the subjective nature of rights in a universalistic legal system, two comments have to be placed here. Firstly, the international venture for the realization of human rights has attained a rather top-down character in the sense that usually in human rights discourse a “deductive” perspective is taken. Thus, it appears to be possible, for example, to distill a number of concretely specified economic, social and cultural rights from the International Bill of Rights while going into the juridical intricacies of legal definition. More in line with the emphasis on individual responsibility is, however, an “inductive” way of conceptualizing human rights: What are poor people’s own perceptions of what they are due in terms of fundamental freedoms and basic entitlements? It is here, again, that religion comes in as a primary force in relating poverty to its reverse side: wealth. Doubtless, then, an inductive approach based on religious interpretations of what is right in the eyes of God, is bound to confront those in power with relative poverty. Secondly, when rights-holders get confronted with non-surmountable obstacles, the responsibilities of other actors involved in these constraints, get activated. Indeed, actors become duty-bearers. Here lies the crux of any human rights-based approach to development and poverty. To actually activate such duties based on a universal responsibility for the protection of human dignity within a concrete context, requires, of course some confrontation with the powers that be. With regard to the normative character of such struggles, religion, once again, may play a crucial part, be it positive or negative.

3. Concluding Observations 
A discourse on the life and times of religion and human rights is important because it sheds lights on two presumable competing spheres: One concerned with the divinity of the religious script and its everlasting relevance, the other with everlasting legal instruments particularly designed to cope with complex forms of human rights abuse. However, beyond this dichotomy there lies two major commonalities: Both religion and the legal instruments developed to defend human rights privilege themselves of being the protectors of human dignity. Second, if humans are created in the image of God, how could religion use the scriptures of God in any manner other than an agency bearing the burdensome task of protecting Gods image. If this is the case then, it is not difficult to relegate the presumed differences between religion and the legal instruments to the domain of politics, where the boundaries between the duties of God and the duties of Caesar  are muddled beyond recognition.

In this respect, religion becomes culture and susceptible to cultural reciprocity and vice versa when it assumes certain peculiaries that could be deliberately employed to stifle human dignity and its very universality. To that extent, it is a difficult logic to grasp if cultural relativism is allowed to project religion as culture rather than as cultures and therefore subservient to the dignity of those created on the image of God. It is therefore not surprising at all that the universality of human rights is often negated by the very politico-religious establishement that abuses human rights. 

In the circumstances, the question what comes first, human rights or religion cannot be avoided merely by separating the two in distinct realms of moral and legal authority, as if they have no commonalities, or by attempting to reconcile human rights and any type of religious discourse. More substantially, the common discourse of religion and human rights is found in their mutual respect for human dignity. It is only by recognizing dignity as agency, as we have alluded to earlier that one can avoid recent attempts geared towards promoting the hu​man rights project as if it is civil religion. This orientation is dangerous because it implies a conscious attempt to develop a counter religion created by ‘man”, leading to unresolved questions about the legitimacy and desirability of adhering to man-made religions. The moral foundations of human rights as civil religion remain questionable and its tenets untenable.

In concluding, then, let us remind ourselves that seen from a religion viewpoint the human rights discourse is not without limitations, particularly as An Na’im puts it:

The international human rights movement is facing growing problems of irrelevance to people’s daily concerns, marginalization in local and global politics, and cooptation by ruling elites, privileged classes and global economic forces in local as well as global politics. In order to resolve these problems, the movement needs to critically re-examine some of its assumptions and policies in order to recapture its original mandate, revise its concepts and methods.”​[43]​

Concomitantly, the capacity of human rights alone to foster substantial equality remains rather complicated in regard to direct judicial remedies. Yet we should like to point to the meaning of human rights as not just legal resources but political instruments, too. The Human Rights approach is a commitment to engage in processes of transformation, with those suffering from material injustices as the primary actors. Obviously, we are referring here to not just economic and social rights, but also to political and civil rights. In the context of the struggles poor people are engaged in, these are empowerment rights. Indeed, without guaranteed freedoms, collective empowerment will be seriously impeded. Conversely, in a complementary role in regard to civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights may be seen as sustainability rights since without the means of living a decent life there is no space to enjoy fundamental freedoms. In international human rights language this is expressed as the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights.
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